

## SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

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**ORDER** 

MARTIN J. COYNE ET AL VS. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, A CALIFORNIA ET AL

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## Instructions:

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ANDREW M. ZACKS (SBN 147794) SCOTT A. FREEDMAN (SBN 240872) JUSTIN A. GOODMAN (SBN 263377) 3 ZACKS & FREEDMAN, P.C. 235 Montgomery Street, Suite 400 4 San Francisco, CA 94104 Tel: (415) 956-8100 5 OCT 0 2 2015 Fax: (415) 288-9755 6 CLERK OF THE COURT Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Petitioners, 7 MARTIN J. COYNE, Deputy Clerk HOWARD WESTON. 8 EDMUND A. CHUTE, and SMALL PROPERTY OWNERS OF SAN FRANCISCO INSTITUTE. a California non-profit corporation, 10 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 12 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 13 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION 14 Case No.: CPF-15-514382 15 MARTIN J. COYNE, HOWARD WESTON, EDMUND A. CHUTE, and SMALL 16 PROPERTY OWNERS OF SAN ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR 17 FRANCISCO INSTITUTE, a California non-WRIT OF MANDATE profit corporation, 18 Plaintiffs and Petitioners, 19 20 VS. Date: September 24, 2015 21 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN Dept.: 501 FRANCISCO, a California municipal Time: 9:30 a.m. 22 corporation, and DOES 1-25, Judge: Hon. Ronald E. Quidachay 23 Defendants and Respondents. 24 On September 24, 2015, at 9:30 a.m., in Department 501 of the San Francisco Superior 25 26 Court, the Petition of Plaintiffs/Petitioners MARTIN J. COYNE, HOWARD WESTON, EDMUND 27 A. CHUTE, and SMALL PROPERTY OWNERS OF SAN FRANCISCO INSTITUTE 28

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("Plaintiffs/Petitioners") came on regularly for hearing, the Honorable Ronald E. Quidachay presiding. Andrew M. Zacks and Justin A. Goodman of Zacks & Freedman, P.C. appeared for Plaintiffs/Petitioners, and Christine Van Aken of the Office of the San Francisco City Attorney appeared for Defendant/Respondent CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO ("City").

The Court, having read the moving papers and supporting documents and the opposition papers and supporting documents, and having heard oral arguments of counsel at the hearing, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby finds as follows:

- 1) The Court takes judicial notice of its prior ruling in *Jacoby*, *et al. v. CCSF*, San Francisco Superior Court Case No. CGC-14-540709 ("*Jacoby*"), invalidating San Francisco Ordinance 54-14;
- 2) The Court finds that the retroactive applicability of San Francisco Ordinance 68-15 to landlords who initiated the Ellis Act process prior to its enactment is improper;
- 3) The fact that the City had previously enacted Ordinance 54-14 (found improperly retroactive in *Jacoby*) did not put San Francisco landlords on notice of future laws, like Ordinance 68-15, even to the extent Ordinance 68-15 *amended* Ordinance 54-14. If anything, the retroactive applicability of Ordinance 68-15 is *more* problematic, for instituting an effective date from the earlier date of Ordinance 54-14;
- 4) The Court finds that the facial challenge is successfully and sufficiently alleged under *Larson* v. CCSF (2002) 192 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 1263;
- 5) As in *Jacoby*, the Court finds the standard for determination of the propriety of the amount of relocation assistance, owed to tenants displaced by the Ellis Act, is whether the payment is "reasonable", not whether it is "prohibitive". (*See, Pieri v. CCSF* (2006) 137 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 886 ("*Pieri*").) The Court in *Pieri* concluded that "a requirement of *reasonable* relocation assistance compensation for displaced tenants does not violate the Ellis Act". *Pieri, supra,* 137 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> at 893-4 (emphasis added);
- 6) Ordinance 68-15 is not directed at the adverse impacts caused by a landlord's decision (i.e., the need to pay first/last months' rent and a security deposit and to incur moving expenses), but is instead *explicitly* implemented to subsidize the payment of rent that a displaced tenant will face on

the open market, regardless of income, and it requires this subsidy for two years. As these payments have no relationship to the adverse impact *caused* by a landlord's decision to exit the rental market, and because they call for a more than 300% increase over the prior lawful relocation assistance scheme, they are not "reasonable" under *Pieri*;

- 7) Ordinance 68-15 places several impermissible and unauthorized obstacles before a landlord who seeks to invoke the Ellis Act to exit the rental market, and it is therefore preempted by the Ellis Act:
  - a. A landlord must tender one-half of the enhanced relocation payment "upon receipt" of a required "tenant declaration". The landlord must serve the tenant declaration "on or before" the service of the notice of termination of tenancy;
  - b. The enhanced relocation payment amount is based on the number of rooms used "for sleeping." However, a landlord has no certain way of determining the number of rooms used "for sleeping" prior to initiating the Ellis Act withdrawal process. A landlord who guesses incorrectly upon mere "belief" will have her Ellis Act process frustrated. *See, Johnson v. CCSF* (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 7;
  - c. For those landlords for whom the enhanced relocation payment constitutes a financial hardship, they can petition the Rent Board for a hardship adjustment. However, unless landlords complete this petition *prior* to invoking the Ellis Act and serving the notice of termination of tenancy, a tenant can demand the full payment before a hardship determination is made. If the landlord (who cannot afford the full payment) fails to pay the entire amount "upon receipt" of the tenant declaration, the withdrawal process is defective.
  - d. None of these procedures are contemplated, authorized or allowed by the Ellis Act and they are therefore preempted on their face. (*Channing Properties v City of Berkeley* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1988, ; and
- 8) Ordinance 68-15 is also invalid as-applied to the individual Petitioners, each of whom initiated the Ellis Act prior to its effective date, and did everything that was required of them to

1	invoke the Ellis Act, but who became subject to new obligations that did not exist when they
2	irreversibly committed their properties to exiting the residential rental market.
3	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Ordinance 68-15 is preempted by the Ellis Act (Cal. Gov.,
4	§§7060, et seq.) and is invalid as-applied to the individual Petitioners and on its face, and it is
5	unenforceable. Accordingly:
6	(a) A writ of mandate shall issue commanding Respondent City to set aside the actions
7	approving and enacting Ordinance 68-15; and
8	(b) Respondent City is enjoined from enforcing Ordinance 68-15, consistent with the findings
9	set forth above.
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11	IT IS SO ORDERED:
12	Dated: 10/2/15  THE HONORABLE RONALD EVANS OLIDACHAY
13	THE HONORABLE RONALD EVANS QUIDACHAY JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
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