The City was not required to prepare an EIR to address the Project’s alleged impact on the loss of rent-stabilized housing units or the displacement of tenants because the property previously had been withdrawn from the rental market pursuant to the Ellis Act; under CEQA the assessment of impacts of a proposed project ordinarily is based on conditions as they exist at the time the environmental analysis is commenced.

Hollywoodians Encouraging Rental Opportunities v. City of Los Angeles affirmed a trial court’s determination that an EIR was not required under CEQA to evaluate impacts of tenant displacement for a property withdrawn from the rental market under the Ellis Act.

When a developer sought to convert an 18 unit apartment building into a 24 guestroom boutique hotel, a neighborhood association (Hollywoodians Encouraging Rental Opportunities (“HERO”)) appealed approval of the permit. The City Council denied the appeal, so the association petitioned the superior court for writ of mandate to reverse the City Council’s decision.
Continue reading HERO v. City of Los Angeles (2019): Relevant Baseline for CEQA Analysis Properly Evaluated a Property Already Withdrawn under the Ellis Act and Therefore Properly Excluded Evidence of Impact on Housing and Population →

In Veiseh v. Stapp, the Fifth District addressed a novel turn on an old rule – that the plaintiff in an action for trespass need not establish title, but is merely required to establish actual possession.

The plaintiff owned farmland, and though he used it for his own purposes, he attempted to transfer it to his ex-wife, for the benefit of their daughter, for estate planning purposes. However, the form of transfer implicated the Uniform Transfer to Minors Act, which required such assets to be held for the benefit of the transferee minor. Plaintiff’s transfer was defective, because he continued to use the property himself. The owner of the adjacent parcel leased to a cattle rancher, whose cattle grazed on plaintiff’s land, damaging it. Plaintiff sued for trespass.

The defendants moved for a bifurcated trial to first litigate the issue of standing. They argued that a trespass plaintiff was required to establish that he was in “lawful possession” of the trespassed land. Because the transfer violated the Uniform Transfer to Minors Act, the plaintiff was not the right plaintiff. The trial court agreed.

The Court of Appeals, however, noted the “well-settled proposition that the proper party plaintiff in an action for trespass to real property is the person in actual possession”. “The proper person to bring an action for trespass to real property is the person in actual possession. In the context of a trespass action, ‘possession’ is synonymous with ‘occupation’ and connotes a subjection of property to one’s will and control. We adopt this definition.”

While the term “lawful possession” is sometimes used to describe the trespass plaintiff’s status, the term “lawful” in this context merely means “not tortious”. The father’s occupation and possession was sufficient to maintain the action, and the Court of Appeal reversed with directions to litigate the second phase of the trial.

“Does a right of first refusal contained in a written lease expire when that leasehold ends and the tenant becomes a ‘holdover’ tenant, and when the lease specifies ‘the continuing [holdover] tenancy will be from month to month’? We conclude that a right of first refusal is not an essential term that carries forward into a holdover tenancy unless the parties so indicate.”

In Smyth v. Berman, the Second District Court of Appeal held that, when a commercial tenant has a “right of first refusal” to purchase the property, included in a term lease agreement, that right is not among the “essential terms” of the lease. Because it is not essential, it is not included among the terms and conditions of the periodic tenancy created by the tenant’s holdover and the landlord’s acceptance of rent.

“When a lease expires but the tenant remains in possession, the ‘relationship’ of the landlord and tenant ‘changes’. The ‘lessor-lessee relationship’ based on ‘privity of contract’ ends, and a new ‘landlord’-‘tenant’ relationship based on ‘privity of estate’ springs into being by the operation of law. (Civ. Code §1945.) This new ‘hold-over’ tenancy is presumed to continue under the same terms contained in the now-expired lease except as those terms may have been modified by the landlord and tenant. (Civ. Code, § 1945) This case tees up the question: If the expired lease contained a right of first refusal, is that right one of the ‘terms’ that presumptively carries forward into the holdover tenancy? We conclude that the answer is ‘no’.”

The court added that this is merely a presumption, and the parties could contract for this term to renew. But absent such intention, this presumption added to the stability of commercial tenancies, by allowing the holdover tenant to remain on a month-to-month basis, under terms and conditions that didn’t give the landlord an incentive to nullify the right of first refusal by evicting their tenant.