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How Long Does an Ellis Act Eviction Take?

The short answer is that it takes 120 days to terminate a tenancy, unless the tenant is at least 62 years old or is “disabled” (as defined by the Ellis Act and housing discrimination law), in which case, it takes a year.

The longer answer:
In general, month-to-month tenancies in California can be terminated on thirty days’ notice. Residential tenancies older than a year require sixty days instead. This is still true for any non-fault-based eviction in a city with eviction control. However, in 1999, the Ellis Act was amended so that tenants receive at least 120 days notice, with the option to extend. And, if at least one tenant claims an extension, the landlord can extend the withdrawal date of every other unit to match. (In other words, the landlord can “go out of business” as to the entire building at the same time.)

Of course, this just answers the question of how much notice your tenant receives before their tenancy is terminated. In San Francisco, the Ellis Act has become more of a political issue than a legal one. (Ellis-displaced tenants receive priority affordable housing, and they have received city-funded legal defense long before the passing of Proposition F.) More often than not, tenants hold over after their tenancies are terminated, aiming to defeat the eviction lawsuit and preserve their tenancy. Sometimes they are successful.
Even when the landlord is successful, they should expect to add five months of intense litigation to their timeline to recover possession.

Preparing for an Ellis Act eviction may require a review of the history of the tenancy (including changes in occupancy), clarification of the form of record ownership, changes in insurance coverage, and even refinancing, if the lender won’t allow Ellis evictions. In other words, the best time to start this process was yesterday. The second best time is right now.

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Justin Goodman Featured in SF Apartment Magazine Legal Q&A for July 2018

Justin Goodman was featured in the Legal Q&A for the July 2018 issue of SF Apartment Magazine – the official publication of the San Francisco Apartment Association.

Justin discussed relative-move-in evictions and the potential defense to an unlawful detainer action based on “tenant retaliation” (even where a tenant is “baiting” the retaliation).


SFAA is dedicated to educating, advocating for, and supporting the rental housing community so that its members operate ethically, fairly, and profitably. SFAA’s is a trade association whose main focus is to support rental owners by offering a wide variety of benefits that address all aspects of rental housing industry.

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Supervisor Ronen Promises New Regulation To Penalize Excessive Rent Increases in Deregulated Rental Units

The SF Chronicle reports that Supervisor seeks to introduce an amendment to the Rent Ordinance that will add to the definition of “tenant harassment” an “excessive rent increase” that is intended to “defraud, intimidate or coerce the tenant into vacating” a rental unit. The proposed legislation would make it “unlawful for a landlord to endeavor to recover possession of a rental unit . . . by means of a rent increase that is imposed in bad faith with an intent to defraud, intimidate, or coerce the tenant into vacating the rental unit in circumvention [San Francisco’s eviction control laws].”

The proposed legislation would address the part of the “venn diagram” of tenant protection law where single family homes are subject to eviction control (if they are built before June 13, 1979) but are exempt from rent control if the tenancy commenced after 1995 (under the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act). The logic of this law is that landlords can increase rents in these units without local restriction, but if they increase rents with the intention of causing their tenants to vacate, then the “real” purpose is to avoid eviction controls, not to get market rate rent.
Continue reading “Supervisor Ronen Promises New Regulation To Penalize Excessive Rent Increases in Deregulated Rental Units”

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Judge Ronald Evans Quidachay Retires After Nearly 40 Years on the Bench

The Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, announced today that the Honorable Judge Ronald Evans Quidachay has retired, after serving nearly 40 years on the bench. Most recently, Judge Quidachay sat as the long-serving judge of San Francisco’s Housing Court (“Department 501”), initially designated as the unlawful detainer law and motion department, but eventually expanding to encompass all real property issues. After retiring on June 27, 2018, he was immediately sworn in as a “visiting judge” to resume his law and motion duties as his successor assumes the law and motion department. He is “survived by” his capable staff research attorney, Olga Grecova.

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Multani v. Knight (2018): Second District Court of Appeal Takes Expansive Approach To Discharging Landlord’s Obligations Following Expiration of Rent Demand Notice

Knight argues, and the trial court agreed, that Salima became a tenant at sufferance no later than when Knight filed the unlawful detainer action against her; therefore, she had only the right of “naked possession,” i.e., the right not to be forcibly evicted without legal process. Salima argues that despite her nonpayment of rent, she retained all legal rights as a month-to-month tenant until she was dispossessed following the conclusion of the unlawful detainer action.

In Multani v. Knight, a commercial tenant (Multani) leased a commercial space from Knight, to use as a medical clinic. As she was winding down her practice, her sons contracted to sell to another physician. However, because of medical issues, Multani stopped maintaining the business. Landlord Knight served a three-day rent demand notice, filed an unlawful detainer when it went uncured, and took possession by default.

In the meantime, plumbing problems lead to water damage to the personal property/medical equipment in the clinic. After the default judgment for possession, Multani sued for conversion of the personal property/fixtures, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment (later re-characterized as “constructive eviction” from a commercial tenancy), interference with contract, and a handful of other claims. Knight cross-complained for the unpaid rent.

Knight filed for summary judgment, arguing that Multani, “could not prevail on any of her claims because she was unlawfully on the premises at all times after July 1, 2011, and was illegally on the premises after December 9, 2011”. This argument, adopted by the trial court, became the architecture for an aggressive published appellate opinion about when the law discharges a landlord’s obligations to a defaulting tenant.
Continue reading “Multani v. Knight (2018): Second District Court of Appeal Takes Expansive Approach To Discharging Landlord’s Obligations Following Expiration of Rent Demand Notice”

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Aron v. WIB Holdings (2018): Tenant’s Premature Filing of “Malicious Prosecution” Action Justifies Affirming Anti-SLAPP Motion Following Remittitur in Underlying Action

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“Defendants argue that the appellate division’s remittitur affirming the underlying unlawful detainer judgment, issued after the trial court’s order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and dismissing tenant’s complaint in the instant case, is not newly discovered evidence and cannot be the basis for a new trial because it did not exist at the time of the anti-SLAPP hearing. We agree.”

In Aron v. WIB Holdings, a tenant prevailed in an unlawful detainer lawsuit for breach of lease. The landlord appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the tenant sued his landlord for damages. The landlord filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that the tenant’s complaint for damages, based on Santa Monica’s tenant harassment ordinance, arose from the landlord’s unsuccessful prosecution of the unlawful detainer – conduct that is protected activity. It also found that the tenant couldn’t prevail on the merits, because the unlawful detainer judgment was not final; the tenant’s lawsuit was premature. Tenant appealed.

Then, when remittitur issued (i.e., when the baton was passed from the reviewing court back down to the trial court), the tenant moved for a new trial in his own lawsuit. He argued that the remittitur was newly discovered evidence justifying a new “trial” (in this case, a new hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion). The trial court agreed, granting the motion, and the landlord appealed.
Continue reading “Aron v. WIB Holdings (2018): Tenant’s Premature Filing of “Malicious Prosecution” Action Justifies Affirming Anti-SLAPP Motion Following Remittitur in Underlying Action”

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Hsieh v. Pederson (2018): Three Day Rent Demand Notice Need Not Allow for Personal Payment of Rent, Nor Does Personal Acceptance Extend the Notice Period

“Where an unlawful detainer proceeding is based on the tenant’s breach, the cause of action does not arise until the expiration of the notice period without the default being cured by the tenant. (§ 1161, subd. 2; Downing v. Cutting Packing Co. (1920) 183 Cal. 91, 95-96.) The complaint cannot be filed until the full notice period has expired, since the tenant is not guilty of unlawful detainer until the full three days — or in the instant matter, 14 days – have expired. (Nicolaysen v. Pacific Home (1944) 65 Cal.App.2d 769, 773 [‘tenancy is not terminated upon the giving of the notice but upon the expiration of the period therein specified’]”

In Hsieh v. Pederson (2018), a landlord appealed from a judgment for a tenant on the procedural basis that the entire action was untimely. A cause of action for unlawful detainer is (commonly) created by the service and expiration of an uncured notice. The tenant moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the trial court granted it on the basis that the notice – which allowed as an alternative cure that the tenant may pay personally during weekdays – could only count those weekdays as part of the “cure period”. Excluding weekends, the action was filed before the expiration of the notice; the Appellate Division of the Los Angeles Superior Court reversed.

Section 1161(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure describes a notice to pay rent or quit. (This is probably the quintessential “eviction notice”, described by statute as a “three day notice”, although for some reason unclear from the record, this case involved a “fourteen day notice”.)

A notice to pay rent or quit must state the essentials – the rent due and the name, number and address of the person who can receive the “cure”. The notice may also allow payment by personal delivery, in which case, it must also state the usual days/hours the personal delivery can be made.

The court held that, “Under the clear language of the [unlawful detainer] statute, the decision to allow personal payment of the rent, in addition to allowing payment by mail by the tenant, is up to the landlord.”

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Justin Goodman Featured in SF Apartment Magazine Legal Q&A for May 2018

Justin Goodman was featured in the Legal Q&A for the May 2018 issue of SF Apartment Magazine – the official publication of the San Francisco Apartment Association.

Justin discussed the history of San Francisco Rent Board’s “Rule 12.20” (which prohibits evictions based on breach of a lease term, if the landlord unilaterally added it to the lease) in the context of state law changes to residential tenant’s rights to smoke cigarette’s in their homes.


SFAA is dedicated to educating, advocating for, and supporting the rental housing community so that its members operate ethically, fairly, and profitably. SFAA’s is a trade association whose main focus is to support rental owners by offering a wide variety of benefits that address all aspects of rental housing industry.

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Will a “Protected Tenant” Prevent Me from Using the Ellis Act in San Francisco?

No, it will only delay your efforts by about eight months. The concept of a “protected tenant” has nothing to do with the Ellis Act. The term comes from one of San Francisco’s other just causes for eviction – the “owner/relative move-in eviction”. Cities may regulate the substantive grounds for eviction of residential tenants, but for constitutional reasons, they must allow at least some mechanism for an owner to live in their own home (or else the tenant’s permanent physical occupation is a “taking” in violation of the Fifth Amendment).

However, San Francisco has been given significant leeway in preventing certain kinds of tenants from being the subject of owner move-in evictions (the most recent being the expanded eviction protection for “educators”, who may not be evicted during a school term). The OMI/RMI statute has evergreen protections as well. For instance, if a tenant is elderly (60+) or disabled, and has lived there for ten years, they cannot generally be the subject of an OMI/RMI. (A tenant also earns this protection if they are “catastrophically ill” and have lived there for only five.)

Now, these provisions do not apply if the landlord only owns one unit in the building (e.g., a condominium) or where the landlord already lives in the building, and each other unit is occupied by a “protected tenant”, and the landlord wants to relative move-in their 60+ relative. (The landlord (or their listing broker) will commonly serve a special form of estoppel certificate asking about a tenant’s protected status. Failure to respond will actually prevent the tenant from raising the defense.)

The Ellis Act, on the other hand, is the only substantive ground for eviction regulated at the state level, and it provides landlords the “unfettered right” to go out of business. Tenants who are at least 62 or are disabled and who have lived in their rental units for at least a year may make a one time claim of extension of the termination date of their tenancy (from 120 days to a full year from the initial filling of paperwork).

While there are no absolute defenses to the Ellis Act, the road to going out of business remains perilous. Especially where it may take a full year to test your paperwork, there is no substitute for qualified counsel.

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City and County of San Francisco v. Post (2018) – FEHA Does Not Preempt Local Anti-Discrimination Regulations Not “Encompassed by Its Provisions”

“[T]he purpose of FEHA is precisely as broad – and as narrow – as the field of exclusivity that FEHA’s preemption clause demarcates. The statute’s purpose is ‘to provide effective remedies” for the 14 categories of “discriminatory practice[]’ that FEHA itself addresses. All agree that FEHA does not reach the discriminatory practice of a landlord refusing to rent to a participant in the Section 8 program. This means that San Francisco’s ordinance prohibiting such conduct has, by definition, a different purpose from FEHA.”

In CCSF v. Post, the San Francisco City Attorney sued property owners for listing ads for rental units that included a statement that they would not accept Section 8 vouchers, in violation of Section 3304 of the San Francisco Police Code. The City sought (and received) a preliminary injunction against the alleged business practice. The property owners appealed, arguing that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) already occupied the field of discrimination in this area. FEHA already prevents “source of income” discrimination, but defines it more narrowly that Section 3304, therefore they are allowed to discriminate against Section 8 vouchers while still in full compliance with FEHA.
Continue reading “City and County of San Francisco v. Post (2018) – FEHA Does Not Preempt Local Anti-Discrimination Regulations Not “Encompassed by Its Provisions””

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